Florida International University

FIU Digital Commons
Discussion Papers in Economics and Banking

Department of Economics

4-1992

Social Values and Social Structures: Some
Thoughts Toward a Political Economy of
Christianity (Discussion Paper #95)
Antonio Jorge
Florida International University, Department of Economics

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/ecxdpeb
Recommended Citation
Jorge, Antonio, "Social Values and Social Structures: Some Thoughts Toward a Political Economy of Christianity (Discussion Paper
#95)" (1992). Discussion Papers in Economics and Banking. 5.
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/ecxdpeb/5

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Discussion Papers in Economics and Banking by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
dcc@fiu.edu.

I
Discussion Papers in Economics

Social Values and Social Structures: Some Thoughts
Toward a Political Economy of Christianity
(Revised Version)

Antonio Jorge
Discussion Paper No. 95
April, 1992

'.
'

",I'

Department of Economics
Florida International University
Miami, Florida 33199

Social Values and Social Structures:

Some Thoughts

Towards A Political Economy of Christianity

A Revised and Amplified Version of a
Paper Presented at the Third World
Congress of Social Economics

Antonio Jorge
Professor of Political Economy
Florida International University

Acknowledgements

Special thanks should be given to Lillian Davenport for her
most effective editorial work which has considerably improved upon
this monograph.
I would also like to express my gratitude to Kathleen
Hasselbach for her diligence and patience in seeing this work
through to completion.

INTRODUCTION
In

order

for

a

Christian

postulated social and also

social

system

economic values,

to

fulfill

it would have

its
of

necessity, from the standpoint of established doctrine, to comply
with

what

constitutes

axiological premises.

its

more

fundamental

and

These latter principles would demarcate the

permissible limits of topological variations
institutional and organizational modes.
conformations ultimately project,
extreme cases,

ontological

in socio-economic

In effect, these social

especially in their polar or

the nature of the conception of man and of his

social life which underlie their formation.

Now, it is on these

grounds that Christian social teaching rejects Marxist socialism
and unmitigated capitalism.

They not only embody unacceptable

views of man and of his social nature, but precisely on account of
this, make use .of organizational and functional. expedients which
inevitably frustrate the attainment of the more immediate Christian
social values and objectives.

That is,

these systems are both

philosophically objectionable in principle, as well as inexpedient
in terms of desired social values and results.

In this respect, it

should be observed that even the prophetic sense of justice and its
manifestation in the old testament was inextricably bound with the
operation of market transactions.

The Judeo-Christian tradition

and ethos operates in a universe of individual rights and duties.
Its teachings and spirit would be totally alien to the arbitrary
and capricious workings of the apatheosized theocratic rulers of
antiquity,

the

absolute

monarchs

supernationalist contemporary state.

of

modernity

or

the

ii
It is no accident that the inception of an integrated view of
the moral requirements and conditions of an economic system had to
await the coetaneous development of the medieval scholastic school
and of a resurgent market economy in Europe.
should be noted.

Two other points

The first is the inherent dynamic quality of

Christian social teachings based, as they are, on a melioristic
perception of human society and a progressive unfolding of the
Natural

Law.

Largely

because

of

this,

the

doctrine

has

historically remained highly flexible and indeterminate regarding
the range of acceptable socio-economic institutions, organizational
modes and corresponding behavior patterns.
is complementary to the first.

The second observation

It deals with what has been called

the sUbjective rationalism of scholasticism.

The gist of

it

consists in the fact that although Christian moral philosophy from
the schoolmen onwards was willing to accept market relations as the
basic framework of economic operations, it nevertheless was never
willing

in

principle

to

unconditionally

accept

outcomes of the blind forces of the market.

as

final

the

That is, Christian

social doctrine steadfastly refused to automatically sanction the
unmediated or unmodified results stemming from the interaction of
whatever market forces happened to exist in concrete situations.
Furthermore, it also rejected, both on ontological and on socioeconomic

grounds,

even

the

pure

unadulterated competitive capitalism.

and

unmixed

Once more,

doctrine

of

it has always

been evident in the unity and internal cohesion shown by Christian
social doctrine that its formulators unequivocally realized the
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interdependent nature of instrumental socia-economic values with
those others which collectively could be referred to as metasociologic~l

in character.

In fact, over the truly long-run the

latter plays the role of independent variables in the social
system, sUbstantially contributing to the particular character of
the former.

All comprehensive and influencing social doctrines

have always been aware of the predominant role played by our
conceptualizations of human nature and their decisive implications
in the molding of society's constitution and behavior.
Christian social doctrine has become increasingly specific and
detailed in its socio-economic analysis, institutional criticism
and policy evaluation and recommendations since the formulation of
Rerum Novarum in 1890.

So much so, that it can be said that the

lineaments of a generic family of systems has been gradually
emerging over the close-to-a-century period elapsed since then.
Incidentally, the writings and declarations of Protestant scholars
and reformed churches can be said to closely parallel the Catholic
position in these matters, just like it was also the case at the
time of the Reformation.
One cannot help but wonder what is the origin and root cause
of the discernible narrowing in the range of global socio-economic
arrangements and institutions acceptable to the aspirations of
contemporary man.

In turn, in a fundamental sense, these

aspirations are eminently compatible with and in fact ultimately
derived from the substratum of Judeo-Christian values on man and
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society which lie at the base of Western civilization.
to

the

palpable

globalization

and

increasing

The answer

homogeneity

of

economic wants and, to a lesser extent, of concrete social forms,
seems to be due to the influence of the historical forces and
trends which have eventuated into the contemporary condition known
as

modernization.

No

doubt,

the

irreducible

Judeo-Christian

conception of man on which the social phenomenon of modernization
rests,

has

by now become

irretrievably universal

through the

diffusion and influence of Western civilization.
Modernization poses a great challenge to modern man.

It can

operate as a radically redemptive force which will elevate and
ennoble man

or

it

can prove

to

be his

final

undoing.

The

Promethean forces released by the modern world threaten to engulf
man

and

to

frustrate

Paradoxically,

the

the

very

very

same

purpose
freedom

of
made

the

human

possible

quest.
by

the

historical advance of values such as dignity, equality, freedom,
and individualism, coupled with scientific and technical progress,
allowing man to shape his life and to choose his options more amply
than at any other time in the past, may also have set the stage for
his spiritual degradation if not his physical demise and total
extinction.
life,

If man debases himself or if he does away with his

it will be done in freedom.

responsible.

No one but himself will be

No one but himself can decide.

v

A METHODOLOGICAL NOTE
In this essay I have attempted to weave in a very general and
preliminary fashion a number of strands which would seem to be the
most relevant and noteworthy in the complex and multi-faceted
fabric of contemporary Christian social teaching.

Many other

building blocks which are part of the prismatic structure of the
political economy of Christianity were unfortunately left out.
Space limitations made the decision to truncate the exposition a
painful but an inevitable one.
Other combinations of topics and specific sUbjects would have
been possible in lieu of the present one.

It could have been held

with considerable merit that this paper should have been more
consistently empirical or, at the other extreme, totally devoted to
a theoretical treatment of the theme at hand.

I believe those

other approaches would also have been valid and useful options.

In

the end, what appears to me as an eclectic solution, albeit one
that emphasizes the historico-theoretical over the purely factual
or concrete, seemed to be the most appropriate alternative under
the circumstances.
One shortcoming of which I am acutely aware is the failure to
explicitly discuss

the social doctrine and pronouncements of

Christian churches other than the Catholic.

My rationale for that

is that there has been since the inception of Christianity a common
corpus of social central doctrines and traditions in the Christian
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churches which are homogeneous and fairly recognizable.

This body

of teachings has, of course, undergone transformation and change
over time, but it has nonetheless retained a substantive continuity
and identity of its own.
fundamental

Not even after the Reformation was any

fragmentation

of

its

denominational lines to be observed.

essential

unity

along

As contemporary events and

tendencies have sharpened our focus on economic issues, forcing
positions on a number of socio-economic questions to a head, the
exactitude and definitude of mainstream Christian political economy
has

correspondingly increased.

The crystallization of those

doctrines have found apt expression in recent social encyclicals
and the documents of Vatican II.

It is my contention that to all

practical purposes, and for an exercise of limited dimensions like
the present one certainly is,
SUfficiently

representative

these sources will prove to be

as

not

to

introduce

any

major

distortions in this presentation.
I hope to have to some extent succeeded in highlighting, no
matter how generally and imprecisely, the theological philosophical
and socio-economic fundamentals for present day Christian political
economy.

Historical developments that have conditioned the'milieu

in which Christian moral philosophy is to operate have been dealt
with in a stylized fashion, that is, in terms of abstractions of
intellectual
modernization.

and

social
No

history

effort

has

such

as

been made

secularization
to

document

and
these

happenings by means of a more traditional historical approach.
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In closing, I would also like to observe that the paper's
intent goes beyond the strictly descriptive and taxonomic.

Even if

in a weak and rUdimentary manner, it shows systemic ambitions.

It

conceives of Christian political economy as a coherent, integrated
and functional whole, possessed of its own inherent logic and
exhibiting dynamic qualities which' are hatched by the unfolding of
historical trends and processes.
which smacks' of perfectibility.

However, there is nothing in this
There are no deterministic or

necessitarian implications in terms of human consciousness or
conduct.

History may incubate certain forces and build a worldly

stage of its own.

still and all, the choice is man's.

I.

I.

SECULARIZATION:

A NATURAL THEOLOGY OF MAN

God created man formally

(a)

intelligent,

free and (c) therefore, responsible before Him.

(b) morally

As a result, all

men are ontogically equal before His eyes regarding their formal
attributes and their corresponding accountability to Him.

Social

freedom is necessary for man to exercise his responsibility.
II.

All

men

are

possessed

of

equal

ontological

dignity

because all have been endowed with a spiritual soul and created in
His image and likeness.

Man is the Son of God.

His dignity also

requires him to be free.
III. Men are to conduct themselves

in a

solidary fashion

because they are all brothers under a common Divine Father.
are

fundamental

principles

of

Christianity,

with

These
direct

implications on the social order and the dynamics of history.
The

above

axioms

constitute

transcendental social consequences.

a

theology

of

man

with

In effect, if man is intelli-

gent, free in the volitional or volitive sense that he can choose
in the light of reason, and, therefore, responsible, then he is
naturally

endowed

with

the

traits

necessary

personal freedom in the social realm.
needs of the common good,
individual.

Now,

to

exercise

his

That is, SUbjected to the

he is free to act in society as an

his inherent dignity,

which has been always

recognized in the Western tradition as something which requires
that his individual freedom be respected, just like God respects it
in the super-natural realm of morality.
1

Furthermore, in order for

his inherent dignity not to be transgressed or infringed upon, his
natural rights as a spiritual being created in God's image must be
fully respected.

In this scheme of things, man's freedom is a

fundamental and sine qua non condition for the exercise of his
reason and volition.

without freedom his humanity is not fully

actualized because he cannot exercise his reason and will.
So man must be free because he is capable of being so, and
because the actualization of his humanity and respect for his
dignity also demand it.

Now, in the social realm, recognition of

man's freedom (again, based on his capacity to be free and on his
inherent dignity) gradually leads to an expansion of the realm of
equality.

Man's freedom can only be legitimately curtailed by the

dispositions of Natural Law in general and those affecting the
common good in particular.

As theories of the common good have

gradually discarded or rejected objective social and political
rationalism,
increased •

the

area

of

individual

freedom

in

society

has

Universal enfranchisement and the disappearance of

theologically sanctioned differences in social status have been
accomplished.

Even

objective

economic

rationalism

has

been

modified to include the universal satisfaction of basic human needs
as a prerequisite for the exercise of social freedom in general and
even for the practice of economic freedom (in the sense of equality
of opportunity and participation in the economy) in particular.
Without

freedom of action

in society man could not have

attained legal, political, social, and economic equality (in the
sense

of

equality of

opportunity)
2

to the

extent that he has

succeeded in doing so in the Western world.

Freedom has been the

efficient or proximate cause of equality.

Sole recognition of

ontological equality and dignity, without freedom of social action,
would not have produced legal, political,

social, and economic

equality.
Nonetheless, ontological equality has been the material cause
or epigenesis, responsible for the ultimate occurrence of legal,
political, social, and economic equality.

without the recognition

of the legitimacy of the former, the latter varieties of societal
equalities could not have crystallized.
action

has

been

the

efficient

In sum, freedom of social

cause

of

the

various

social

equalities because it afforded the opportunity for human thought
and action to test, challenge and change the inegalitarian legal,
political, social,.and economic arrangement of society.

As these

proved to be neither rationally impregnable nor necessary for
society's organization and function,

they were brought down by

freely acting individuals which found them deleterious or limiting
to their well-being.

In turn, freedom of social action would not

have been tolerated unless the implicit premise of ontological
equality had not

been admitted.

Recognition

of

ontological

equality signified that human social freedom could only be limited
by the dictates of Natural Law and the requirements of the common
good.

Neither, of course, were opposed to those various forms of

equality.
Now, individualized freedom and equality in society need not
lead to the type of contemporary individualistic society with which
3

we are familiar.

That is, they need not eventuate into a modern

secularized society.

The ultimate causes of secularization lie

somewhere else.
Aside from the host of contributing forces and associated
conditions which have mutually reinforced one another in a complex
circular causation-type-of-process over the centuries, there is one
fundamental and autonomous variable which is the cornerstone upon
which the subsequent historical process of secularization rests.
The underlying factor tying the whole evolutive process together is
an active concern for, and a high valuation of, the material world
and of human life and action within it.
Western man' s
extremely marked.

purposiveness towards the world has been
Man's inherent purposiveness has reached the

acme of its transformative manifestation in the Western effort to
dominate the material world through scientific and technological
development.

with freedom as an efficient cause, and ontological

equality as a material one, individualism in the societal realm was
bound to advance very rapidly as it, in effect, did.
The concurrence of a number of other factors increasingly
oriented Western societal individualism towards economic production
in general and the commercial world in particular.
of

an

exponential

curve

for

the

growth

of

The confluence
scientific

and

technological knowledge; cultural and economic interaction through
the European land mass; and a number of associated instrumental
elements like population growth; the proliferation of towns; the
emergence of dense transportation and communication networks; the
4

mUltiplication of fairs and markets; the invention and diffusion of
financial institutions and instruments, were all greatly important
in shaping the contours of the Western world.
These natural or vegetative processes were sUbstantially
accelerated by the separation of Church and Empire, the surging of
the new European nation states, their interminable wars, and the
crucial role played by economic development in sustaining the
policies of the absolute monarchs.
expansion

of the middle

classes,

The impulse given to the
and their

growing

relative

importance in society in consideration to the role they played in
manning the economic development process, was certainly a no less
important factor.

The history of the bourgeoisie is essential to

the understanding of the modus operandi of the constellation of
forces which have produced the secularization of the world.
Although the bourgeoisie would have certainly prospered on its
own,

quite

aside

from

its

quasi-political

role

during

mercantilistic period and the era of absolute monarchs,

the

it is

equally true that these historical developments were of enormous
importance in magnifying .the impact of this class and the speed
with which it disseminated its ideas through the social body.

The

clear inclination in Western Civilization not to restrain the
individual's freedom of social action beyond what the paradigms of
the age define as necessary for the common good, had already opened
the way for the rise of the bourgeoisie since very early after the
constitution of the Holy Roman Empire.
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The previously mentioned

negative and political

fa~tors

served to give further impulse to

this development.
Concurrently,

the

materialization

of

the

world

(greater

relative abundance of material goods) and its commercialization by
the bourgeoisie would of themselves tend to, and in effect actually
did, facilitate the secularization process, although there was no
inherent necessity for that outcome to have taken place.

That is,

the disappearance of the economic restrictions represented by the
Church's moral framework and their formal support by the state,
accelerating after the Reformation, certainly contributed to the
exacerbation of an acquisitive or purely economistic behavior on
the part of the economic agents.
How much of a constraining factor the Church-State entente
would have been had it lasted, no one really knows.

In any case,

mercantilism and national wars worked in the opposite direction.
They multiplied the opportunities for profit and further freed the
conditions under which they could be made.

Later on, as the class

compact and social solidarity inherited from old gradually broke
down in the nation states under the influence of economistic
behavior, secularization kept on making successive inroads into the
life of society.

That is, the bounded perimeter for legitimate

economic behavior to take place, i.e., the social framework which
was to serve as referent for economic values,
shattered.

was repeatedly

Ultimately, only the individual facing himself was left

standing.
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Conceivably, man could have avoided this result.

At a purely

speculative level of discourse, it is imaginable that he could have
held to a set of abstract, non-economicsupraindividual values,
even if the available opportunities--negative developments; the
Church-State conflict; progressive materialization of the world-would have
behavior.

strongly

inclined him to

an unbridled

economistic

Just like at an earlier time, neither the Church nor the

Empire restrained themselves sUfficiently to avoid their rupture,
and again much

like how Roman

precipitate their separation,

and Protestant clergy were to

so modern man was to ineluctably

advance on the road to secularization and undeterred individualism.

Fundamentally, the above train of historical events rests on
the high regard of Western man for the material world and his quest
to better his own condition in it whenever possible.

It is true

that the notion of progress did not become generalized until
perhaps the Seventeenth Century, but an increasing number of people
had opted to abandon the land and traditional life since much
earlier.

This

in

contrast

to

other

civilizations

overpopulation had dire consequences without
people

deciding

to

break

Indeed,

there

is

an

away

from

activism,

a

large numbers of

customary
dynamic

where

life

patterns.

character

and

aggressiveness, which is peculiar to Western civilization.

The

desire to achieve and to indulge in social deviance have shown a
much higher

statistical

civilizations.

incidence

in

it

than

in

other

large

A critical mass for that kind of behavior obtained
7

about the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Century in Europe.
of

objective

or

agricultural
facilities)
commerce,

accumulative

revolution,
and

population

sUbjectively

banking,

factors

finance,

A conjunction

(technological
growth,

generated

advance,

intra-structural

elements

(increase

drive to establish towns)

in

had been

slowly reinforcing and interacting with one another for a long
time.

Now, a momentum was reached which made for the acceleration

of the growth process.
Interestingly, outwardly similar social and material processes
in the Arab World and China,

as well as in a host of ancient

civilizations and cultures, never yielded results comparable to
those reached in the West.

Perhaps the great European SYmbiosis

represented by the multisecular and complex interaction of a number
of disparate cultures and experiences which took place from the
Graeco-Roman

period

on,

had

unique

and

non-repeatable

characteristics.
During the period of the Pax Christiana Europe became a
relatively

CUlturally

homogeneous

area,

SUbsisting

in

a

geographically compact but still resource-wise diversified area.
These factors,

in conjunction with the above mentioned socio-

psychological elements, created a distinct and singular historical
reality.
Even destructive wars and internecine conflict in Europe did
not derail the material progress of the area.

Economic development

itself became a tool of the religious and succession wars that the
continent experienced for centuries.
8

However, the momentum of the

European culture and ethos were such that despite great material
losses and the decimation of the population, scientific creativity,
technological advance, intellectual speculation, artistic work and
sustained effort at material production went on.

Individually led

effort in all areas of life did not wane, but rather proliferated
with the passage of time despite apparently adverse obj ective
social conditions.
It would seem that the frequency and willingness on the part
of large numbers in the population to evince a dynamic attitude and
to

engage

in

non-traditional

and

innovative

behavior,

is

characteristic of European civilization and differentiates it from
other large cultural systems.

In this sense, business and the

businessman are of one essence in accounting for the development of
Western civilization.
preferential

Economic and mercantile activity have been

channels

for

personal

creativity and upward social mobility.

expression,

domination,

These profound subterranean

currents and culturally shaped trends were deeply enmeshed in the
very fabric of the culture.

They were part and parcel of what we

understand by Western culture and are inseparable from it.

Their

social manifestation would not have been precluded even if the
Reformation had not given occasion for
Calvinistic ethic.

the

formulation of

a

The actual flow of the historical river would

have been perhaps somewhat different and its meanderings would have
followed other patterns but, essentially, the end results would
have been the same.

That is, even if Church and empire had not

sundered, even if the moral restrictions on economic activity would
9

not have been removed, sooner or later Western Civilization would
have

confronted the problems

modernization.
former.

stemming from

secularization and

After all, the latter inevitably follows from the

Ultimately, the great challenge of Western Civilization is

the harnessing of man's genius, of Prometheus' fire, to the service
of

spiritual

values.

There

are

enormously powerful

inherent

tendencies in it working against a harmonious synthesis of spirit
and matter.

Perhaps only a supremely free act of man's will can

accomplish this.

Finally, his freedom will decide his fate as it

has decided his life.
Western man cannot transfer personal responsibility for his
acts

to

anyone

else.

There

are

deceivers from outside to be blamed.

no

masters,

exploiters,

He has created his reality.

He has the power to define himself, his life, and his world.
can live with God or without Him.

10

or

The choice is his.

He

II. SECULARIZATION AND ECONOMISM
Let us now explore other associated facets of the secularization process which relate to the vastly expanded role and
importance of the economic function in society since the late
Middle Ages.

First, there is a quasi-mechanical process which

dictates that the advance of secularization will automatically
bring about a greater valuation of the economic function and
corresponding devaluation of other superordinated social subsystems.
the

We are not simply referring to the tautological fact that

definition

of

the

term

secularization

itself

denotes

a

separation or autonomical development of the economic realm, which
gradually comes to free itself from any superordinate system of
values, be it supernal or not.

Obviously, in the course of that

process, economic values change their subordinate position and,
thus, of necessity are elevated in rank, both absolutely, and also
in relative terms to other formerly superordinated value systems.
Rather,

the aspect which

experiential one.

is being focused upon here

is the

In brief, this signifies that as secularization

advances and economic functions gain in independence, they will
inevitably tend to become ends in themselves, conditioning other
less immediate, tangible and time consuming values and realities.
These will grow increasingly remote, and although paid lip service,
will inevitably become less functional and visible in everyday
life.

In extreme cases, such values may turn into mere symbols and

stereotypes, having been enshrined in conventional and functionless language and ritual which are totally segregated from real
11

life, that is, an independent economic realm will tend to put other
subordinate realms out of existence, rendering them ineffective
and, finally, superfluous.
There is another facet of historical evolution which enhances
the role of economic life.

That is the quest for equality in the

various realms of man's life.

Economics is the last frontier of

equality excepting the right to the privacy of one's person and
company.

Other forms of equality, regardless of transcendental

ulterior effects on man and society, do not have of themselves such
a large immediate impact on social institutions and the conduct of
daily

life.

Religious,

legal,

political,

and

formal

social

equality--i.e., absence of legally condoned distinctions in social
status--do not impinge on daily life with the disruptive force that
changes in economic institutions and organizations do.

It is in

this respect that the advance of economic freedom in the history of
the

West

has

been

the

modifications in society.
on

this

point.

connected

with

instrument

radical

and

profound

Clearly, there is no need to elaborate

Moreover,
the

of

protean

the

issues

and

interpretations

consequent
of

terms

battles
such

as

equality of economic opportunity or equality proper, have now come
to

occupy

the

central

stage

in

the

affairs

of

contemporary

societies and the world at large.
Let us examine this question further.

Why the importance of

economics for social equality, the implementation of human freedom,
and even the expression of ontological dignity?
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The general answer to that question is that a certain minimal
amount of absolute economic welfare

(in terms

of man's

basic

needs), of relative well-being (in terms of one own's society and,
of the world's level of technological and economic development),
and of respect for the individual's personal right to equality of
economic

opportunity

cultural

variability

egalitarianism),
manifest

(with a

and

is

and

minimum assured
historical

totally necessary

express

their

base sUbj ect to

epoch--i.e.,
if human

ontological

limited

beings

freedom,

are

equality

to
and

dignity in the contemporary world.
Today's world is not only highly material (in the technical
sense of roundaboutness in production and of a large volume of
consumption per unit of need or want satisfaction), but also one in
which man's instrumental intelligence and social structures are
ever

more

activities.
developed
activities.
developed

at

the

service

of

economic

ends

and

commercial

Furthermore, it is a world in which economic life in
countries

is

no

longer

connected

with

subsistence

Furthermore, it is a world in which economic life in
countries

is

no

longer

connected

with

subsistence

activities, or with providing the paraphernalia for non-economically acquired social status, or even as it turns out to be the
case in affluent western societies, with validating the worth and
social status of the individual through economic success.

Economic

activity is increasingly becoming in highly advanced societies the
final cause of social life itself.

It is the ultimate object or

goal of man's strivings, due to the fact that its working directly
13

translates into hedonic or, more generically, egoistic pleasure.
Thus the economy has turned into a narcotic.
of satiety and the dullness of surfeit.
own end.

It induces the torpor

consumption becomes its

Pleasure reflects upon itself.

reality, not a means to something else.

It becomes the only

Even highly sophisticated

and apparently uplifting activities, like those related to art and
culture, may be undertaken for purely egocentric and self-serving
reasons.
In the classical liberal tradition the economy is a proximate
means

which

provides

the

wherewithal

for

carrying

out

the

activities and actions that have been consciously and independently
chosen by the individual.
freemen in social life.

These,

then,

Consequently, the spheres of means and

ends remain totally separate and distinct.
the

individual

contrast,

is

not

are the true ends of

influenced

The self-awareness of

by economic

processes.

By

the attitudes and behavior characterizing economism,

which are those associated with the socio-structural condition
called modernization (the former term refers to the psychic or
subjective requirements of modernization: motivations, attitudes,
incentives, and behavior; the latter deals with the corresponding
social institutions, their structure and functioning), are derived
from a milieu in which the economy suffuses and permeates man's
conception

of

life,

orientation

and

personal

cumulative, circular and self-reinforcing fashion.

conduct

in

a

However, it is

not a question as the Marxists would have it, of consciousness
being

determined

by

economic

conditions.
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Rather,

it

is

an

acceptance,

a

voluntary giving in by man to a

practical

life

conception founded on psychological and moral utilitarianism where
the economy is the ultimate end, the purpose, object, and rationale
of social life.

The economy then becomes the final cause of man's

life in society.
Secularization and the Future of society
As pointed out before, the delay of the Second Coming and of
expectations regarding its imminence constitute the substratum and
remote

antecedent

environment,

operating

in the

creation of

a

secularized

one in which the problems of this world kept on

acquiring increasing importance and demanding impatient attention.
That is, as one had to concern oneself with the organization of
this world and had to settle down for permanent habitation of the
planet,

material values

inevitably had to gain in importance.

This, of itself, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the material world had to become autonomous, disassociating itself
from the spiritual world.

The superordinate function of the latter

over the former could have conceivably continued, say, if Church
and Empire had not parted their ways.

But,

no doubt,

linkage became progressively more improbable as,
time continued to elapse, and,

(a)

such a

historical

(b) as natural and normal (in the

sense of fully expectable and in agreement with human nature)
ambitious
primacy

(personal and social)

over

more

ethereal

and

spiritual claims and strictures.

needs kept on asserting their
less

immediate

and

pressing

Another reason which is often

invoked to explain the occurrence of historical secularization is
15

not. as

convincing

as

technological progress.

(a)

and

(b):

namely,

scientific

and

In brief, there is again no necessary

reason why in principle one cannot adopt the classical Western
solution to the problem of theism in an increasingly scientific
culture.

That is, to think of God more along deistic than strictly

providential lines.

God could always be the prime causa, the prime

mover, the Creator, but not the actual ruler of the world.
In any case, there has been a progressive long term tendency
towards secularization of the world evermore noticeable since the
religious Reformation.

As we know, what this means in practical

terms is that uncontrolled or autonomous material values are able
to gradually assert themselves in the world.

Theoretically, one

could maintain that sensu stricto, such a development is possible
without a weakening of those meta-material (religious, moral and
ethical) values of the individual whose inspiration and essence do
not rest on the foundation of enlightened or reasonable egoism.

In

reality, to accept such a possibility as viable one would have to
imagine a world in which the impact or influence of material (or
for

that

matter,

non-material)· values

on

the

psyche

consciousness of the individual would be totally neutral.

and

In other

words, one would have to believe that those values have no overall
shaping or molding influence on the individual's sense of selfidentity, his beliefs, motivations, attitudes and behavior.

To

imagine that material values will not predominate, even if not
appropriately reined in either by institutions or a very strong and
well defined consciousness to the contrary, is totally naive and
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unreal.

Conceiving of material values as being merely instrumental

in a world where they hold sway and reign unchallenged, at least in
the

realm

of

everyday

reasonable conclusion.

praxis,

is

very

hard

to

accept

as

a

That is, material values have, like non-

material ones, their own ideational and noetic influence over the
human mind.

If they constitute a strong reality they will have a

correspondingly strong effect over the human psyche.
A second,

more often cited reason to explain the shaping

influence of values on the mind relies, as we have discussed, on
the importance of value-conformed institutions in creating our own
conception of the nature of reality.

In effect,

institutions

organized and structured in accordance with certain sets of values
impact us from the outside as separate entities.
and

act

upon

us

as

reified

and

crystallized

presence color and condition our world and,
restrict

and

delimit

our

choices,

They influence
realities

whose

at the very least,

alternatives

and

possible

behavioral paths.
In the intellectual history of the Christian West one can
differentiate four sets of values and institutional experiences
that will illustrate this.

These sets do not neatly correspond

with an historical chronology,

and do not represent either an

attempt at periodization or the construction of a stage-type theory
of history (Stufenlehre), nor do they posit a theory of evolution
or development based on this or that recognizable historical force
or trend.

These four experiences can be categorized as follows:
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(1)

spirituai

values--spiritually

oriented

institutions;

(2)

spiritual values--materially oriented institutions; (3) material
values--spiritually oriented institutions; (4) material values-materially oriented institutions.
Set number one would ideationally correspond to the first
centuries of Christianity and efforts of the Fathers of the Church
to shape the material world in accordance with the intentions and
precepts of the Scriptures.

Set number two roughly coincides with

scholasticism from Thomas Aquinas on and extending from about the
Thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries.

Set number three is clearly

associated with the Reformation and the socio-economic outlook of
Protestantism, as explained by Max Weber, and is most particularly
relevant to the views and doctrines of Calvin.

The fourth set is

identified with the social ideologies and practices of our own
times in advanced western countries, above them all, the united
states.
Notice that in the context of set one, religious values would
dictate the conformation of social institutions which would then
directly

respond

to

the

ethos

of

those

values.

Ideally,

institutions would be perfectly in accordance with the values in
question or minimally deviate from their ethos.

In set two,

institutions have already deviated considerably from the ideal of
the religious values supposedly informing their formation.
those

values

restrict the acceptable range of

institutions and behavior in society.

still,

variation for

The latter are constrained

in their constitution and functioning by the religious ethos.
18

Set

three inverts the relationship obtained in two. Materially oriented
institutions,

although pursuing their own logic and particular

ends, must still be rationalized in the light of ultimate religious
goals

and

teleological

dispensation.

schemes

in

agreement

with

divine

In the last set the institutions and behavior of

society are totally unconstrained by meta-material considerations
in their organization, structuring and behavior.

Any attempt at

reconciling social institutions and a transcendental ethos and
values is purely nominal in nature.
of

perfection

and,

generally,

Verbal injunctions, counsels

moral

laudatory

and

hortatory

statements are non-operational in terms of established realities
and behavior.
Fully developed Capitalism and orthodox Marxist socialism are
very much compatible with the last mentioned combination of values
and behavior.

Material values and behavior and an individualistic

outlook on life and society are ideal companions.
one

another

capitalism

very

well.

embodies

the

In. a

fundamental

essence

individual utility maximization.

and

very

They complement

sense,
logic

archetypal
of

optimal

It is a codified institutional

behavioral system directed at the most intelligent attainment of
that end.

Marxist socialism in its actual praxis and in the

system's theoretical conception is no different in its end of
maximal individual satisfaction and material development.
Basic Western socio-political

egalitarianism,

which quite

effortlessly, is conceptually extensible to the economic field, is
itself a mixture of Benthamite utilitarianism in the realm of
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theoretical

social

policy,

and

of

the

impatience

of

popular

reaction to the lowness and ineffectiveness of the trickle down
process in laissez-faire capitalism.

This makes the historical

appearance of such ideas perfectly logical.
Marxism both pertain

to

historical

are

filiation

the

same

quite

Pure capitalism and

genus.

Their

similar.

logical

Soviet

Marxism

and
or

Communism of course, is a modified version of Asiatic despotism
and, as such, much closer experimentally to the Maoist socialist
experiments

in China

and

European counterparts.

Southeast Asia than

On the

other hand,

to

its

Western

Euro-communism or

socialism with a human face would theoretically constitute not so
much

a

quantitatively

divergent,

reality

different,

from that

of

but

rather

a

qualitatively

soviet communism.

It would

ultimately require motivations different from those of capitalism
or those others exhibited in the past by soviet Marxism for its
successful operation.

One would do well to be highly skeptical of

the viability of Euro-Communism.

Ultimately, just as in a limit

situation, the core economic differences between capitalism and
socialism would mainly

be

of

a

psychological

nature,

so the

differences

between Humanist and soviet socialism do

likewise

reside,

least

profound

at

psychological

strictly

divergences

in

principle,

embracing

the

in

their

central

concepts

of

philosophical and historical determination and of human nature
itself and its

functio~al

relation to society.

Let us now proceed to add a related comment on the breakdown
of community.

The value roots, instrumental motives, attitudes and·
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behavior of Anglo-Saxon (Western in contrast to Occidental) culture
are ultimately incompatible with the preservation of community.
contrast

in

the

case

of

Iberian

and

its

descendant,

By

pre-

capitalistic Hispanic-American culture, the conflict was not nearly
that acute.

However, the family of the latter sub-cultures is

rapidly disappearing under the dual onslaught of capitalism and
Marxist socialist ideas.

Even to the extent that those paradigms

would formally persist in an institutional or organizational sense,
it seems highly unlikely that profound value-based dissimilarities
with Anglo-Saxon culture will continue to survive.
of

institutionally

and

behaviorally

Reinvigoration

operational

chains

of

compatible values, motivations, attitudes and behavior that would
translate into appropriate social action and institutions, are
necessary if this likely outcome is to be reversed.

In the end,

that would prove to be the only possible manner in which the
identity of those sub-cultures could be preserved.

In other words,

cultural differences would tend to disappear not as a result of a
predetermined outcome brought about or imposed by historical forces
and

processes

responding

to

mechanisms

impelled

by

economic

determinism, but rather as an outcome of the more or less

~reely

adopted cultural, institutional and behavioral patterns typical of
modernization processes.

In the distant future, surviving cultural

/

differences will be of a superficial nature.

Customs, habits and

social forms. may vary from one society to the other but the
essential orientation of the individual to his society and to his
fellow man will be, for the most part, highly similar everywhere,
21
•

with

the

possible

but

not

too

probable

exception

of

a

few

fundamentalist and nativistic societies.
Consumerism,

explicitly

and

unabashedly

self-centered

behavior, an exaltation of material values as proper ends of man's
activities and as operational definiens of his life, will become
the universal norm.

still

and all,

the sterile and deadening

officially imposed cultural uniformity brought about in the past by
soviet socialism in its various epiphanies and avatars is, however,
infinitely less desirable.

Its theocratic nature and apotheosizing

of the state, its bureaucratism and utter contempt for the rights
of the individual,locate this family of systems in a far removed
universe from that of the two previously mentioned ones, even when
allowing for the soothing effects of affluence and" the ultimate
advance of consumerism.

Any attempt at a common taxonomy would

result in a futile exercise.

soviet socialism is the archetype of

Oriental despotism and represents a genus whose specific difference
consists in the suppression of the individual and the exaltation of
the political and military-economic might of the state.
Finally, an observation on the survival of the consciousness
of freedom among the few and the possibility of disseminating that
particular

value

among

the

majority

of

mankind.

betterment will not bring by itself a yearning for
freedom and political righte.

Less so will

Economic
individual

it guarantee men

rebelling against totalitarian states in the search for them.
the other hand,

On

without a minimum of economic welfare and the

benef its of a humanistic education one should not expect many
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people evincing a strong demand for those intangible goods.
identification

of

the

factors

and

conditions

The

that will make

individual freedom and political rights intensely desirable to men
is not clear at all.

In the final analysis, one thing has become

historically obvious:

Humanistic values were not able to survive

in the stifling atmosphere of Soviet socialism.

The cultural

elements embodying those kind of values will not be able to endure
under that kind of a rule.

Again, only superficially different

cultural manifestations will be tolerated in such societies.

The

pendulum of our age oscillates between the crude materialism and
meaningless freedom of consumerist societies and the horrendous and
nightmarish totalitarian repression of Eastern despotism.

Is there

room available and time left for a humanistic or Christian-like
culture?
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III.

NATURAL LAW, SCHOLASTICISM AND SOCIAL REFORM

It would be convenient at this point to recall that Natural
Law doctrine displays an ancient and uninterrupted lineage that is
coextensive

with

the

development

of

Western

thought

and

civilization, having conditioned the innermost fibers of the latter
and the ideal structure and behavior of its institutions.

The

encyclicals are, as a matter of fact, the most important example of
contemporary, undiluted documents along those lines of thought.
Their

general

documents

are

standing,
a

principles

and

rationale,

extension

and

timely

logical

traditional Christian moral philosophical doctrine.

gyg

social

elaboration

of

As such, their

spirit and sUbstantive approach are historically availed by the
practically unchallenged consensus of opinion and analysis in the
field of Christian moral philosophy until the advent of the modern
historical
respects,

period.

As

a

matter

of

fact,

in

many

important

it could be unequivocally stated that a consensus of

opinion has existed even after the Reformation and down to our own
days.

This applies,

of course,

to "rationalist," Natural Law

thinkers and not to inspirationist ones.
that in the areas we are

concer~ed

It is of interest to note

.with, namely, that of socio-

economic relations in the polity, the last two centuries have been
dominated by ideological systems of political economy originating
in derivations or perversions of medieval Natural Law sociology.
Such a situation should not be surprising if we were to pause
to realize that, no matter how much the premises on Which some
explanation of social phenomena may differ from say,
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those of

Aristotle, no coherent and rational view of societal relations can
be entertained if denial of ratio recta to perceive and relate
human nature to its surrounding reality is denied.·

After all,

barring the explainable but naive infatuation of the Enlightenment
and its latter-day offsprings in the second half of the Nineteenth
Century, no serious social scientist fails nowadays to acknowledge
the analytical efforts of the scholastic doctors in this direction.
Even

their

confusion

sounds

surprisingly

modern,

too.

The

contributions of the schoolmen (often grouped and distinguished by
schools of thought) derived from systems built on observation both
of their immediate reality and on an essential view of human nature
in society gathered from a phenomenological perception of its
attributes and manifestations in everyday life.
Social science nowadays, in respect to its ultimate principles
and

observations,

is

certainly

no

more

sophisticated

or

knowledgeable, although considerably less straightforward, candid,
or even structurally integrated, than scholastic science was at its
best.

The social physics of positivism, a la Pareto, Edgeworth or

Comte,

not only ended by being regarded as unscientific but,

ironically, proved to possess an infinitely more naive view of man
and his universe than the schoolmen ever had.

Hayek long ago

warned with abundant reason and unsurpassed common sense against
the methodology of a wrongly understood "scientism" in the field of
the social sciences.
days

to

keep

Although there is supposedly no need in our

beating

the

dead

horse

of

the

contemporary

doctrinaires of social philosophy, the preceding remarks could be
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extended

to

the

equally

superficial

but

fanatical

efforts

to

covertly peddle warmed up cosmological views of man and society in
supposedly "neutral" and "scientific" assessments of reality.
On the other hand,
escapist

desire

bent

on

there

is at present a

ignoring

the

need

quite extended

for

an

explicit

recognition of fundamental conceptions of man and society.
acceptance of widely held views

in these matters

Candid

is not only

essential to relevant views in the field of political economy, but,
furthermore, would not detract from that scientific spirit, which
in the minds of some, seems to be at odds with anything redolent of
reality.

The

problem,

of

course,

does

requirements of the scientific method,

not

reside

in

the

but in the lack of the

requisite boldness or frankness to admit what everybody knows,
namely, that the scientific method is not a fixed measuring rod or
nostrum mechanically applicable to diverse types of reality.

That

the nature and requisites of observation and testing assume diverse
forms in accordance with the quality of the phenomena at hand.
Even

if with the necessary reservations

economic analysis proper is "purer"

it were granted that

(more immediately testable)

than political economy, this would only be a matter of degree.

In

any case, as indicated by Fellner and.Sorokin, if a body of axioms
or assumptions are explicitly·postulated and relational connections
between variables established in a segment of reality, such a body
of knowledga is a science.
Now, we must keep in mind that for the encyclicals economic
analysis is just a tool and that the Church documents aim at the
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propagation of the fundamentals for the creation of a family of
socio-economic orders whose justification or worth is rooted in an
ancient rational (Graeco-Roman) and religious (Christian) view of
man.

Although such a view is peculiarly or specifically Western,

elements of it, especially those regarding religious teaching on
the ontological worthiness of man and on right conduct had already
made partial historical appearances in other civilizations.

It

cannot be said, on the other hand, that previous to the Western,
Natural

Law

development,

there

had

been

any

substantial

preoccupation with the socio-economic and political implications of
an essentially egalitarian view of the moral worthiness of man.
The Greeks, of course, had made their brilliant theorizing
efforts through the classical contributions of Plato and Aristotle
to political theory.

Both,

as we know,

in conformity with the

universal-libertarian political spirit of today, not to speak of
their

related

political life.
Natural

Law

views

on

the

socio-economic

preconditions

of

Even in the Middle Ages, before the mainstream of

philosophy

fragmented

in

diverse

directions,

the

libertarian spirit which is logically deduced from the doctrine of
free will and the inherent moral value of the human person, was
interpreted within,

or constrained by,

society of the times.

the rigidly stratified

Social and economic prerequisites were

themselves relative toa previously defined rank order in society.
Nonetheless, Natural Law philosophers, vide the example of st.
Thomas, had always affirmed that knowledge or comprehension of the
dictates of Natural Law is a dynamic, perfectible process, taking
27

place through time.

Our insights gain clarity only progressively,

but in the light of right reason, hopefully in an unidirectional
and irreversible fashion.- The gradual appearance of contemporary
nearly classless societies, characterized by the vertical fluidity
of all social and income groups would, in no manner, have surprised
the scholars.

Such political and social transformations as are

taking place today would not only have been deemed, correctly, as
incidental to the fundamental dictates of Natural Law as applied to
social life,

but,

furthermore,

arisen at their time,

had such circumstances actually

they would not have lacked sYmpathetic

understanding and historical antecedents, as well as theoretical
championing, in many reared in that tradition.
The scholastics came close, but never quite reached in their
vision the level of theoretical economic integration achieved by A.
Smith or F. Quesnay.

Naturally, the use of Natural Law, both as an

intellectual substratum as well as an overarching and unifying
master

concept,

allowed

them to

develop

congruent view of the social process.

a

comprehensive and

In that conception, the

economic world was not separate or autonomous or greatly important
in itself.
As scholasticism developed, especially from the Thirteenth
century onwards, their investigations into the social field coupled
with their Natural Law notions of a normal, just and beneficent
objective order of things, led them to increasingly accept concepts
structurally and functionally associated with the notion of the
market system.

It was logical for the scholastic doctors to think
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of an objective order as also a natural one.

Their gradually more

refined and analytically elaborate rendering of the competitive
price construct as a market embodiment of just price, is a prime
example of this tendency.
On the other hand, as their empirical knowledge of the social
world increased and as the workings of the market system expanded
and strengthened after the lower Middle Ages, Natural Law became
gradually more casuistic and interpretive.

with the passage of

time, it became clear that, to a considerable extent, the actual
substantive implications of its secondary principles could only be
fully

elucidated in the

light of the

concrete circumstances

informing particUlar cases or homogeneous categories of these.
with

the

explicit

recognition

of

the

importance

that

partiCUlar conditions surrounding individual cases or sharply
defined genuses of these now had, it was obvious that the schoolmen
would

not

only

come

to

contemplate

interventions

into,

or

regulations of, social affairs as a perfectly legitimate expedient,
but, nay, as an indispensable policy instrument for the promotion
of the ultimate religions and moral ends which were truly important
to man and thus the object of their concerns.
However, one proviso need be added to this statement.

The

schoolmen's fundamental mental framework called for order and
coherence.

Their ideational universe would not have suffered a

sUbjective rationalism composed of ad hoc directives and dictates
without any systemic redeeming grace to it.

SUbjective rationalism

had for them to be validated and justified not only in terms of a
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set of absolute and transcendental values, but also as adjustments
and iterations to some ideal social norm or earthly "City of God".
One other strand essential to an understanding. of scholastic
thought is derived from their hierarchical conceptualization of
man's ends, activities, and corresponding actions.
life occupied a purely instrumental role.
twofold sense: the first,

In it, economic

This,

again,

in a

as social arrangements and material

mechanisms whose proper end is to directly satisfy man's needs for
economic goods and services.

The second, as a realm where man's

essence as a person and his social traits are to be properly
manifested

and

developed.

His

eminent

dignity,

freedom,

sociability, and responsibility are to be exercised and reflected
in the conduct of his economic life.

Therefore, the good economic

system has to be appropriately ordered to that end.
The sYmbiosis of these various concerns eventuates in a unique
mixture of objective and sUbjective rationalism.

It rejects the

early classical view of laissez-faire, just like it spurns the
socialistic centrally planned economy.

Both fail to satisfy the

requirements of social justice and the higher demands of a truly
human socio-economic order.
Although from a superf icial and purely expediential viewpoint,
it would seem that the material requirements of the Common Good are
satisfiable under a modern liberal economic regime, this would be
highly deceptive.

Even if a prosperous, full emplOYment economy

has been acceptable to many contemporary Christian authors on
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practical grounds, it would still fail to meet the most profound
conditions of a just and humane economy.
The ordering of the social economy must be such that man's
rule is not exclusively an instrumental one, subservient to the
goals of production, the. commercial economy or the state.

His

direct individual action, and responsible participation, through
autonomous

intermediate

associations

and

variously

composed

vocational groups, working with the state under the principle of
SUbsidiarity, but guided and oriented by an overall commitment to
social solidarity and cooperation for the realization of the Common
Good, are irrecusable and irreducible propositions of Christian
moral philosophy and social economics.
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IV.

THE CHURCH(ES) IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

As noted above, attainment of minimal (absolute and relative)
economic conditions for mankind are necessary requisites for the
exercise of human social freedom,

for the social expression of

ontological dignity, and also for the manifestation of the formal
attributes on which ontological equality is based.
Now,

in

domination

a

of

civilization

the

world

and

and

belief

system

the

accumulation

where
of

man's

scientific

knowledge, the perfecting of technical experience and continuously
increasing production of material goods, have become synonymous
with his God given worldly mission and raison d'etre, it is only to
be expected that economic activity would objectively gain in
importance.

Within the geographic context dominated by Western

societies and culture this would further mean that the commercial
system and its specif ic . social relational forms have come to
prevail ever more forcefully.

Nowadays, for the poor and deprived

minorities in developed countries and for the large masses of
I

L. D. C. s, economic activity is of enormous consequence.

Not only in

the minimal, absolute sense in which human needs must be satisfied
for man to be able to lead a socially free and dignified life which
would be a reflection of his inner freedom and dignity, but also in
relative or comparative terms to others in their own societies and
also abroad.

This does not mean that all of mankind must adopt the

same lifestyle or lead an homogenous life at the same level of
"development."

What it points to is' that although productive

technologies and institutions, customs and habits of life, cultural
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character, weltanschauungen and ideologies may widely differ among
the peoples of the world, basic levels of knowledge, intellectual
development and command of relevant scientific paradigms must be
reasonably similar for ontological and social equality and dignity
to be an universal reality in the contemporary world.
The role of the Christian Church (es)

is to attempt the

herculean task of reverting economic life and activity to an
instrumental role in developed societies and to orient and guide
the

bast programs

L.D.C.s.

of political

and socio-economic reform in

These would have for their purpose to make the economy

play its classical instrumental role as a handmaiden to man's
social freedom, of facilitating the embodiment of his ontological
dignity and equality in appropriate patterns of social life, and
last but not least, allowing the individual to exercise his own
private choices· in regards to social actions which involve a
positive economic cost.
It is quite different at the purely intellectual level to
conceive of how Christianity could succeed in transforming the
psychological components of the economistic position.

Equally hard

is to conceive of how such a modification could be incorporated
into a redesigned socio-structural and functional system different
from that which today prevails in modernized society.

No less

arduous is the task of imagining how L.D.C.s could attain not only
satisfactory rates of economic growth, but equally importantly, how
they

could

implement

development

programs

tailored

specific social needs, cultural preferences and values.
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to

their
If one

adds the shrinking of the time dimension in the contemporary world
to be previous obstacles,
despair.

the picture is one of almost total

Risinq expectations on the part of the new nations, sharp

ideological conflicts,

economic scarcity,

old institutions and

vested interests, all conspire against rational hope for a peaceful
and consensual solution.
Religions always emphasize subjective or inner personal over
institutional changes.

The latter, if it is to come at all, is to

be a consequence of the long term action of the former on social
structures.
oriented of

Although Christianity is the most practical and action
all

the major world religions,

different from others

it has

in regards to this matter.

not been
spiritual

transformation is the key to a better world.
Although Christianity,

in principle,

has always made the

individual accountable for the moral effect of his social actions,
it has been careful to delimit his responsibility within the ambit
of the social context in which the person operates.
has never, as a rule, demanded social heroism.

Christianity

The individual has

not been called upon to break existing institutional molds or to
judge his actions according to patterns and criteria different from
those prevailing in the society in which he finds himself inserted.
In other words,

the individual Christian is not a soldier of

ideology committed to the implementation of an ideal vision of the
City of God on earth.

It is not his duty to consciously activate

a philosophy of history for it to move along its preordained path •.
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Historically,

he

has

never

been

required

to

live

beyond the

stationary state.
However, conditions have changed in our time.

In the past,

absence of moral progress was not a survival issue for mankind.
present,

the wide gap between man's

At

scientific and technical

capabilities and his moral development poses a direct danger to the
future of the human race.

Situations which in the past could be

callously but safely ignored,

are turning into critical issues

demanding immediate attention.

The moral imperative is now prodded

by proliferating intra-societal and international conflicts.
From the standpoint both of a purely idealistic and ideational
sense, that is, in a noetic or conceptual as well as in a hortatory
or moralizing sense, the Christian Church is today in a better
position to be relevant to the world than at any other moment since
the

Renaissance.

The

social

doctrine

of

Christianity

is

progressivist and is based on the notion of the meliorism and
perfectibility of both man and society.

Especially since the

Thirteenth century onwards, it has become clearly established that
the comprehension and application of secondary or derived Natural
Law principles in all matters, including social ones, is a dynamic
and

unfolding historical process.

knowledge,

and

the

slow

emergence

Man's
of

gradual

increase

objectified

in

economic

structures and mechanisms in the Western world from the early
Middle Ages onwards,
freedom

and

in conjunction with the advance of social

equality,

have

greatly
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sharpened

the

Church (es)

understanding of the requirements and characteristics of a just
social order.
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V.

THE INCREASING SPECIFICITY AND OBJECTIFICATION
OF CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING

The general injunctions and exhortations on social justice of
the prophets of the Old Testament, and of the early Church Fathers
in the Patristic literature, became progressively more precise and
articulate as a result of the doctrines developed by st. Thomas
Aquinas and the schoolmen under the rubric of Justitia et Jure.
A new level of specificity was reached in our own times with the
pUblication of the encyclical letter Rerum Novarum by Leo XIII at
the close of the last century (1891).

From then on, each new

encyclical and social statement has been more specific than the
preceding one,

discussing and evaluating social

and

economic

institutions, organizations and behavior in great detail and in a
very realistic fashion.

Some of the watersheds in this process

have been Quadragesimo Anno by pius XI, Pacem in Terris, given by
John XXIII, Populorum Progressio during the reign of Paul VI and,
most

recently,

Laborem

Excercens,

written

by

John

Paul

II.

Clearly, both the Natural and Supernatural Theology of the Catholic
Church are
message.

indispensable in order to understand their social

Innumerable recent documents have provided the requisite

background and base on which the Catholic teaching on society
rests.

Among the most important are:

the Syllabus on Modern

Errors, given by pius IX in 1865; the encyclicals, Inscrutabili
Dei; Quod Apostolici Muneris; Cum Multa; Immortale Dei, Divine
Redemptoris; and special messages, like Nell'Alba and Con Sempre,
among very many others.
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By way of background,

it would be convenient as well to

mention in passing some of the landmarks in the recent history of
the Catholic Church in Latin America.

The two most important

meetings of the region's episcopate have been:

The Second General

Conference of Medellin (1968) and the Third General Conference in
Puebla (1978).

Prior to them, the First General Conference of the

Latin American Episcopate took place in Rio de Janeiro

(1955).

Another important meeting was the Celam Conference in Mar del Plata
(1966) •
Medellin

was

primarily

concerned with

the

Church

trans-

formation in Latin America in accordance with the teachings of
Vatican II. It focused on the role of the Church in helping to
alleviate the plight of the poor.
same

road,

concrete

although

social~

Latin America.

carrying

Puebla was to proceed along the

further

the

exploration

of

the

economic and political conditions prevailing in

Two documents from Paul VI proved of great value in

applying the general teachings

the

church to the

specific

The~e are, Octogessima Adveniens and

circumstances of the.areas.
Evangelii Nuntiandi.

of

They emphasize the importance of identifying

the cultural roots of the people and of building on them.

It is

specifically acknowledged in the two that there may be many diverse
forms of Christian culture.

These will vary in accordance with the

idiosyncracy of the various people and also the nature of the
times.
Puebla states that the

La~in

of Western European culture.

American culture is a derivative

It is a result of the hybridization·
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of the Iberian and the indigenous cultures.

It goes on to assert

that the Church is the most unifying factor in Latin America and
i ts

culture.

After

affirming

that

the

liberal

ide.ology

has

contributed to the diffusion of political liberty in the area, it
notes

that

visible.

elements

of primitive

capitalism are

still highly

The Church's position is that of wanting to help in the

construction of a new society.

One in which there will not be any

marginal people and which will be based on equality and fraternity.
Also where everyone will have access to the essential goods:

food,

clothing, housing, health, educational, recreational services, and
cultural activities.
to

personal

rights

All of this to be attained without prejudice
or

civil

liberties.

The

Puebla

Document

declares that "democracy with all of its weaknesses is closer to
the defense of
system;"

the Christian values than any other political

The document also points out to the

"very frequent

tendency in Latin America to have recourse to violence,
should be the last resort."

which

In its view, the challenge confronting

I

Latin America is that of creating a just but free society.
In reaching these conclusions in their deliberations,

the

Latin American Episcopate is following in the footsteps of the
universal Church's traditional teaching in the area of society's
governance Which consistently rejects violence except in extreme
cases where the authorities violate Divine or Natural Law.

This

doctrine harks back to the teachings of the schoolmen and most
especially, st. Thomas Aquinas.
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The conclusions of the Puebla conference were very specific in
respect to the issue of violence.

The final documents deplore and

condemn

violence

the

use

of

political

by

authorities and by terrorists and guerrillas.

the

established

Political crimes

always vilify those who commit them, independently of reason given
to excuse them.
liberation.

Violence cannot be justified as a means of

Violence always engenders new forms of oppression and

slavery, usually worse than those they were supposed to remedy.
The present, Pope himself,

in his inaugural speech at the,

Puebla Conference, explicitly condemned all forms of political
violence as gross violations of human rights.

Regardless of their

source or origin, or of any attempted justification for its use,
violence was to be rejected.
The Second Conference of Latin American Bishops at Medellin
also addressed the use of political violence in similar terms.

The

proceedings quote the reaffirmation of Pope Paul VI of the basic
teachings of the Church on the subject in the encyclical Populorum
proqressio.
Common

Good

Again, although in extreme cases of violation of the
resorting

to

extra

legal

means

may

be

morally

justified, the Pope reminds us that armed revolution is the source
of new injustices, ruin, and social disequilibria.
eliminate one evil at the price of a larger one.
changes are not really effective.

One cannot

Abrupt political

Social transformation has to

take place through a process of increased awareness on the part of
the people and with the direct participation of the population at
large.

with this in mind, the bishops reaffirm their faith in the
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"fruitfulness

of

Allocution

Bogota that

in

evangelical."

peace,"

quoting

from

"violence

Paul

is

VI

in

his

1968

neither Christian nor

It is also fundamentally important to realize that

the Church is adamantly insistent on its independence from any
political or social ideology.

The Church is based on, and has for

its mission, the projection and dissemination of a transcendental
vision of man and his role in society.
Puebla Conference reaffirm that
Church

~ust

The proceedings from the

position.

They state that the

reject the temptation represented by certain groups

within it which want to advocate specific political policies, or
that wish

to

standpoint.

interpret

the

Gospels

from

a

partial

political

In Puebla, it was said that "The Church must maintain

itself free from opposing systems in order to be able to opt for
man."

"The Church does not need to have recourse to ideological

systems in order to defend and help in the liberation of man."
Finally, concerning specific or concrete views and positions
on economic reform, it can be accurately said that both Medellin
i
and Puebla,

and the teachings of John Paul II,

reflect quite

faithfUlly the seminal ideas contained in Mater of Magistra and
Populorum

Progressio.

The

concrete

topics

around

which

the

problematique of socio-economic development is being discussed by
the Church in Latin America were already outlined at Medellin.
These are the excessive degree of social and economic inequality in
the

societies;

the

marginalization .of

large

segments

of

the

popUlation from socio-economic , political, and cultural activities;
the unjust exercise of authority by those in power; the inequitable
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conditions in international trade, investment and financing; the
tax evasion and policies on profit reinvestment by multinational
corporations and other investors, and similarly related issues.
It is worth remarking, at the risk of repetition, that the
formal acceptance of the universal socio-economic implication of
certain humanistic values has gradually increased during the last
few

decades,

accompanied

by

the

heightened multi-dimensional

interdependence of the world, which includes the building of a
complex

international

institutions.

network

of

econpmic

and

financial

simultaneously with our expanded knowledge of the

social consequences deriving from the application of the secondary
principles of Natural Law to present day societies, along with our
deeper

understanding

of

the

processes

of

modernization

and

development, there has been a rapidly growing awareness of the need
to adopt concrete domestic and international policy measures and
programs in favor of the poor.
Especially in the case of societies where the prerequisites
for development have not yet been established, it will be necessary
to bring about such transformations as required to facilitate their
creation.

In line with these historical trends, the encyclicals

have gradually become more concerned with the evaluation and
criticism

of

means

(institutions,

organizations,

economic

mechanisms, international system) than with the mere restatement of
general and abstract principles.
This development in the encyclicals' treatment of political,
social, and, above all, economic issues, is extremely important and .
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will have far reaching effects on the manner in which the Church
deals with the social question.

In a very obvious and immediate

way, it will get the Church increasingly involved in the world.
International

debates

and

proposals,

governmental

programs,

specific economic and even political policy may not fall under the
purview of Church criticism and appraisal.

Undoubtedly, some will

see in this an unwelcome politicalization of Christianity.

Those

criticisms have already been leveled at other Christian churches
for precisely that reason.

At the other extreme, for many it will

be a welcome and long overdue relief from vapid generalities which
could be conveniently interpreted in a variety of contradictory
ways.
In the end, this will inevitably lead to a resurgence in the
age old question of God versus Caesar.

Hopefully,

a greatly

historically wise Christianity will not stumble on the rocks of
secularism or angelism in its dealings with an enormously complex
world in the throes of transition.

Neither Henry of Sagusia or

Petrus Bertandi, nor William of Ockham or Marsilius of Padua will
now do.
The globalization of the impact and influence of Western
civilization has greatly accelerated during the Twentieth Century.
The incipient trade relations of antiquity and the early Middle
Ages, the Crusades, protracted warfare and colonialism, have ended
up

in a

situation characterized by economic

interdependence,

political strife and technological miniaturization of the world.
Interestingly,

as

hinted

at

various
43

points,

the

legacy

of

fundamental Judeo-Christian values, central to the contexture of
Western civilization, has proven to be of permanent and ever wider
appeal to peoples of all political persuasions, traditions, and
cultures.

Nominal adherence to these values is now a must, even by

those that grossly violate them in practice.

Unfortunately from

the viewpoint of this author, that has not been the only value
inheritance that
equality,

freedom

the West has
and

donated

individualism,

the world.

under

the

Dignity,

influence

of

secularism, have become transmuted into economism and unbounded
economic

materialism,

exacerbating

ever

present

utilitarian,

hedonistic, and generally egoistic, tendencies ever present in man
and society.
with the above in mind, let us now recapitulate those dynamic
trends and new situations which have come to characterize our
contemporary understanding of the term modernization. Through the
demonstration effect they tint human aspirations everywhere and
sharply constrain the range of solutions acceptable to modern man.
1

These are:
(1)

Greater present knowledge of -the purely technical workings of
the economic system than in the recent past.

(2)

Better

understanding

of

the

Also,

inter-relations

between the

economic subsystem and other social subsystems.
(3)

As the economic sUbsystem has become increasingly secularized,
its essential logic is evermore apparent. Also, its operation
is now much less constrained or curtailed by extra-economic
. restrictions which used to interfere with the functional logic
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of the system in the past.
market

arrangements

or

That is, economic rationality (in
in

planning

schemes

directed

at

recreating market conditions and their outcome) can assert
itself much more fully

under contemporary conditions of

secularization than at an historical period when the substance
of that logic and its practical outcome were considered
objectionable.
(4)

The logic of economic life is, by its very nature, much more
precise, manipulable, and applicable to the real world, than
the fundamental principles governing other realms of social
activity.

Nature's niggardliness, the mUltiplicity of human

wants and needs, the very limited physical energy of the human
being,

the

inner structure of technology and production

functions, and the necessities of the organizational world,
singly and cumulatively account for this.

Thus, as economic

logic has come to suffuse social life, "intelligent" action
and policy options

b~come

much more restricted and empirically

ascertainable.
(5)

Greater present importance accorded to the economic world as
an instrument of, and a means to, fully realize human dignity
and the essential equality of men.

(6)

As science, technology, and affluence have kept on with their
relentless progress, creating a new more material society for
the great masses in developed countries, the economic world
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(independently for

the purpose of this

argument of

whether it is considered an end in itself or simply a
means to other consciously chosen ends)

has come to

occupy a larger portion of the time and activities of man
(compare the number of working days now to those in the
Middle

Ages

at

relative

levels

of

productivity).

Consequently, the economic logic has come to prevail, as
means or ends, over a much wider area of human life than
was the case in past epochs.
(7)

As economic relations have become more widely integrated, now
constituting a well organized world system, the application of
economic rules turns out to be greatly more feasible than in
a

fragmented

and

compartmentalized

universe,

like

that

existing in past epochs.
(8)

Finally,

economic

individualistic,

logic
and

is,

strictu

economic

sensu,

relations

rigorously

are

rigidly

egalitarian, in the sense that personal maximizing behavi9r is
the only operational mode yielding efficient (in the sense of
optimal aggregate benefit)

and determined results for the

working of economic structures.
Given the historical progress of religious, legal, political,
social,

and

economic

individualism

as

a

result

of

the

operation of freedom as an efficient cause, and equality and
dignity as a material cause in the West, the pure logic of
economics becomes a valuable instrument for the organization
of a socially just economic life.
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This is so much so the

case, that even the counsels and injunctions of the Church in
favor of individually poor people or of poor nations in the
world do not dispense with the essential logic of markets and
exchange.
indirect
supersede

Although the Church goes beyond the classical
controls
or

of

abolish

the

economy,

the

institutions.
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logic

it
of

does

not

exchange

seek
and

to
its

VI. MATER ET MAGISTRA AND BALANCED GROWTH:
POPULORUM PROGRESSIO AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

This section will attempt to briefly exemplify how the social
teachings of the Catholic Church are gradually gaining in concreteness and direct applicability to the social question.

Mater et

Magistra is the one encyclical that specifically refers to balanced
economic growth.

The encyclical treats and elaborates the non-

economic consequences or effects following from the application of
that approach to economic development.

Balanced growth is seen to

be compatible with or, better, conducive to the Christian goals in
social life.

The doctrine of balanced growth is thus set in the
It is

total context of social organization and institutions.

organically interrelated to a particular or specific social pattern
whose characteristics would partly emerge from the application of
the balanced growth method itself to the economic sphere.

Rerum

Novarum and Quadragfesimo Anno, the other two preceding encyclicals
with major economic content, serve to acquaint us more fully with
the nature of the social traits

and goals that

follow

from

adherence to the principles of Natural Law, whose promotion is
fostered by the application of balanced growth to development.
Although the concern of the encyclical is not with economic
analysis as such, nonetheless important phenomena related to the
latter are indirectly clarified in the process of investigating the
relationship of balanced growth to social forms and processes.
That,

of

course,

was

to

be

expected.
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After

all,

economic

development as a social phenomenon can be identified with economic
variables only in terms of the most immediate functional relations
of these.

Some of the insights thus gained in the study of the

encyclicals prove to be valuable in the theoretical field where
debate between balanced growth and its opposite has moved.

In the

process, a better appreciation emerges of the nature and strength
of the relations existing between a certain pattern of development
and such other elements as geographic dispersion of investment,
income distribution, gradualness of development strategy, private
actions versus pUblic planning and compatibility with democratic
institutions.
Concerning the preceding questions which embody the crux of
our analysis, the contribution that the encyclical makes to their
clarification can be classified as follows:
(1)

The

encyclical

states

some

evident

connections

between

balanced growth as a cause and certain outcomes, both of an
economic and a non-economic nature, which are regarded as
constituting desirable goals in themselves.
(2)

The encyclical states some other relations between balanced
growth as a cause and other outcomes, e.g. democratic institutions, which are not immediately evident.
With the above in mind, we may now interject the notion of

balanced growth in the wider context of a dynamic socio-economic
and political milieu.

In such an ambience, the purely economic

concept acquires a new teleological dimension.

It is no longer one

more growth strategy, but an instrument for the realization of
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fundamental man-desired goa.ls.
framework,

one

more

thread

It truly becomes,
in

the

singular

in this new
pattern

that

characterizes the often submerged ancient mainstream of Christian
political economy.
requirements
instrument

of

In that context, balanced growth is one of the

the

for:

Common Good.
(a)

sustained

Balanced growth becomes

an

and

or

smooth

(efficient

continuous), as well as exponentially predictable (the result of
the gradual and foreseeable building up of sectoral relations and,
thus, of the full-emploYment rate of growth) economic development;
(b) Development based on a not-excessive rate of non-consumption,
as ensured by the very efficiency and gradualness of the process.
In order for the growth process to be efficient or continuous on
the one hand, and gradual (inter-connected) on the other, the whole
development process must be geared to and oriented by, at least
primarily, market indicators.

This condition will serve to provide

limits to the level of present sacrifices;
dispersion

of

income

than

that

under

(c)

patterns

Wider sectoral
of

investment

!

characterized
geographic

by

a

high

dispersion

of

sectoral
income

concentration;
than

under

(d)

Wider

concentrated

(locationally speaking) sectoral investment.
In relation to income distribution, the following questions
have to be considered.

An unbalanced growth strategy will tend to

have a higher concentration of capital intensive industries per
unit of investment than a gradual investment approach would show.
Also,

(a) capital intensive industries may show a higher rate of

profits than labor intensive ones; and (b) wage rates may be higher
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than in more labor intensive industries, but there will be less
employment per unit of investment.

In addition, like in the case

of high profits, the marginal propensity to import of the income
recipients will be high, and the mUltiplier-accelerator mechanism
with whatever effect

it could have on growth through

investment, will be also smaller.
and

so

would

Liebenstein

be

reinvestment

Investment

induced

However, savings may be higher,
as

criterion.

indicated
With

a

by

the

remote

Galensonpat~ern

of

investment (concentrated on the Austrian description of the higher
stages of the production matrix) the actual dispersion of income
distribution will depend on whether the remote pattern itself is
(a) relatively concentrated or (b) dispersed.

A dispersed remote

pattern, it is true, could distribute income among as many sectors
as a more proximate, market-oriented pattern.

But even in that

case, the remote pattern would not distribute income among so many
people as the proximate model would.
Finally, it should be realized that a balanced strategy is
1

associated with rapidity or fastness of growth.

Balanced growth

with limited resources (that is, excluding diverse versions of an
all

encompassing,

def inition,

unlimitedly

gradual.

resources is,

endowed

Big

Push)

must

be,

by

The more modest the quantum of available

relative to what is anticipated as the final or

terminal position of full development, the more gradual the process
must be.

Gradualness results from the parallel, coextensive and

simultaneous
gradualness

growth
are

of

fixed

inter-related sectors ~
by

the

amount
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of

The

available,

limits

to

investable

resources existing at a moment in time, by the stage of development
(input/output relations
foreign

supply of goods

already built),

by the volume of the

and services,

and by the pattern of

intermediate and final demands for goods and services.
Balance makes for rapid growth through its continuity.
implementation

of

this

pattern

implies

and

The

requires

the

simultaneity of parallel and symmetrical growth or extension of
prod~ctive

relations

among

closely

related

sectors.

The

ambitiousness of the effort or, what is the same, the determination
of what constitutes closeness in a particular situation is,
course, variable.

of

The overall rule, though, calls for the building

of inter-connected development blocks in an uninterrupted fashion
in

the

balanced approach.

slowness, but efficiency.
in

the

weaving

of

Gradualness

is

not

tantamount

to

The efficiency of gradualness, reflected

connected threads

is

more

rapid

than

the

dispersion of effort typical of more spectacular approaches.
Populorum Progressio contains some very modern teachings on
development and international relations.
colonial

policies

which

have

fostered

After decrying those
monoculture

instability in the economies of colonized lands,

and,

thus,

it goes on to

state the serious obligation of advanced nations to help the
developing ones.

Rich countries have the duty to help poor ones.

The former should not keep all of their wealth to themselves.
should contribute to the development of the latter.
context,

there is a

need to create a
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They

In this

world fund to disburse

financial and technical international aid, making grants and soft
loans available to those nations needing them.
After reiterating that the principles held by Rerum Novarum
remain valid, the encyclical goes on to say, in reference to trade
relations between developed and underdeveloped countries that, if
the power of the contracting parties is too unequal, the consent of
the parties themselves is not sufficient to assure the justice of
the contract.
relations.

There is thus a need to rectify inequitable trade

The document then proceeds to assert that the exchange

economy cannot be exclusively founded on free competition.

The

same rules that apply to the determination of the just wage are
also valid in the area of international contracts.

It concludes

that free trade is equitable only if sUbjected to the requirements
of social justice, and that prices reSUlting from the operation of
competitive markets can actually be unfair.
Populorum Progressio is extremely specific in its teachings on
international economic relations.
and

unexpected· fluctuations

in

It calls attention to the sharp
the

prices

of

the

primary

commodities exported by the less developed countries,

and the

progressively increasing price of their imports of manufactured
goods from developed countries.

As a result of this, the poor

remain in that condition, while the rich grow still richer.
Clearly, the encyclical comes down in favor of the thesis of
the secular deterioration of the terms of trade relation for
underdeveloped countries.

It espouses an analytic approach to the

question reminiscent of that of R.
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Prebisch.

Translated into

economic language, it seems to attribute oligopolistic powers to
developed countries
oligopsonistic

ones

developed nations.

in the conduct of their export trade and
in

their

purchase

of

imports

from

less

Populorum Progressio maintains that a certain

equality of opportunity has to be established in the relations
between developed and less developed countries.

To that effect, it

recommends the adoption of schemes for price stabilization of
internationally

trade~

goods, cqmmodity agreements, and other such

measures as will serve to create a more balanced exchange between
the two groups of countries.
In

closing,

the

encyclical

letter

asks

for

greater

collaboration and organization among the less developed countries
in order to promote their common advantage.

It would also be

beneficial for them to coordinate their investment and organize
their trade.

Moreover, regional agreements among these nations and

wider cooperation for their mutual economic' support, are to be
taken as signs of progress on the road to development.
the

document

emphasizes

the

important

role

to

be

Finally,
played

by

international institutions in helping to establish an order of
justice among nations such as the one it describes.
As

indicated at the beginning of this

section,

Mater et

Magistra and Populorum Progressio have been selected as prime
examples to illustrate the tendency towards particularization and
policy specificity, along with the clear intention to make use of
economic

analysis

and

social

science

propositions,

characterizes contemporary Christian social teaching.
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which

section V

amplifies on this topic,

both by making reference to empirical

evidence in other social documents,

as well as by means of a

theoretical recapitUlation of the trends and forces accounting for
this development.
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VII.

THE COMMON GOOD:

THE ROLES OF COOPERATION AND COMPETITION

Cooperation and competition can coexist, but at different
levels of social organization.

Different economic institutions and

arrangements have to individually reflect or be based upon either
a competitive or a cooperative basis.
in social organization.

Both forces must be utilized

Harmony and reconciliation between them

takes place within the total

social

structure.

It

is this

structure which must be functional, well-coordinated and congruous.
The overall rationality, harmony, and coordination of the structure
does not derive from the singleness or identity of its components.
But from the skillful, wise, and natural (in accordance with the
necessities of human nature and principles of social organization)
blend between opposed but equally primeval, and thus, useful and
powerful forces.

That is why the true overall and highest good of

the community, the Common Good, will not derive from arrangements
or associations that do not provide room for the working of these
forces.

The suppression of competition, for example, in the name

of a wrongly understood, artificial solidarity enforced by the
adoption of certain social forms, will not eliminate the basic
motives and drives behind it without, on the other hand, being able
to preserve efficiency.

At the other extreme, the suppression of

explicitly recognized and institutionally incorporated solidary
values makes for the fragility of the social structure as reflected
in the alienation of great numbers who feel no commitment, if not
outright antipathy, towards their society.
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This is most especially

aggravated in situations of economic backwardness, when relative
differences

in

income

are

contemplated

from

below

at

levels

sometimes precariously verging on purely physical subsistence.
In

accordance

occupational groups,

with

the

above

it

should

be

clear

that

oftentimes popularly conceived in Catholic

social literature as comprising antagonistic economic interests,
should not be viewed as the basic decision making agents in the
economy.

These associations have a

function to discharge

in

helping to elaborate the overall general economic guidelines of
society,

as well as

in providing and preserving the solidary

characteristics of the social system

(which

in turn mark the

outward limit or boundaries of desirable competitive behavior).
But as regards economic conduct in the vast area within,

the

individual first and foremost, and his representative organizations
only in a collaborative and subservient function to him, should be
entrusted

with

behavior.

The

the

vital

function

individual

must

of

maintaining

remain,

at

all

competitive

moments,

the

identif iable economic agent in whose behalf and through whose
actions economic production,

consumption,

and distribution take

place.
To substitute some collectivity for the individual as the
basic unit of economic action and evaluation, would resemble the
utilization of hypothetical constructs endowed with a reified life
.and teleology of their own, as is the case in German idealistic
philosophy;

or else,

is akin to the gross analogies between

anatomy and physiology on the one hand, and organismic theories of
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society, on the other.

The first leads to conclusions that, by

nature of the case, will always be incompatible with the test of
reasonableness.

They are logical, but not rational.

they are not operational

In that sense

(or less so than those philosophical

systems based on some form of sensualism).

The latter are crudely

animistic, tending to ascribe to the purely formal structures of
the social kingdom the nontransferable characteristics of life in
biologically organized beings.
It is a tribute to the realism of the mainstream of scholastic
philosophy and the Lockeian tradition that their view of the
individual and society was such, that it has constituted a solid
substratum for the modern development of the social sciences along
scientific lines and with a powerful leaning towards the empirical.
The preceding does not preclude, of course, a realistic study
of social collectivities and relations.

If this were to be the

case, economics would be, which it is not, a rather stereotyped and
formalized conglomerate of axioms applicable to Robinson Crusoelike situations and nothing else.

It is always possible to

formulate perfectly rational and consistent bodies of policies once
reasonable neo-classical assumptions--a la Marshall or Edgeworth-about interpersonal comparisons of utility and partial welfare
functions, their mutual relationship and order of preference, are
determined.

Christian social thought has never recoiled at this

prospect and is certainly up to that task.

The entire Common Good

tradition or the more specific body of Peschian economics would
serve as a case in point.

However, to plunge into the currents of
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economic and welfare relations between collectives solely garbed in
the armor of economic theory (say in the manner of Kenneth Arrow
and his impossibility theorem) is to surely sink to the bottom.
swim

in

those waters we

need

a

clearly

formulated

axiological priorities, preferences, and interactions.

list

To
of

Only then,

with economics acting in a purely technical role, can we hope to
attain meaningful and efficient social solutions.
The concept of the Common Good,

Public Good,

or Public

utility, or as expressed nowadays Social Welfare, was aimed by the
schoolmen at facilitating the satisfaction of the socio-economic
needs and wants of the members of society to the greatest possible
extent, given the circumstances and limitations of each particular
historical

situation.

consequently,

it was

directed at the

attainment of the greatest aggregate satisfaction possible in the
given historical contexts of time and place.

Their analytical and

'normative propositions, then, were directed towards what was just
and convenient in the institutionalization and regularization of
economic life.

For it was necessary to reconcile the differences

. and antagonisms that would emerge if each individual were to try to
attain a maximum of satisfaction for himself in an unconstrained
environment, thus, in effect, disregarding the legitimate needs and
satisfactions of others.
Clearly, the greatest happiness of one man may result in the
profound unhappiness of ano.ther.

That. is why the motto of Bentham,

"The greatest happiness of the greatest number," must be severely
qualified,

so that the happiness of the collectivity may not
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eventuate in the greatest happiness of the majority at the expense
of a minimum of happiness for the rest.
In passing, two important issues instrumentally but closely
related to the attainment of the Common Good should be mentioned.
First, what kind of an economic organization would be required to
produce the desired results?

It has been amply proven that the

instantaneous position of maximum satisfaction in production would
result

from the markets· attaining long run equilibrium under

perfect competition, plus whatever other adjustments the optimal
would require relating to increasing and decreasing social and
private costs, as well as other kinds of social externalities.
Dynamic efficiency would necessitate,

of

course,

taking

into

account such other variables as the level of R&D, productive
investment and entrepreneurial activity in society.
reason,

one might add,

All the more

to make certain that the spirit and

incentives to private enterprise and activity are given ample
opportunity to bloom in a receptive milieu.
On the side of distribution, we would have to keep in mind
other concepts relating to redistribution as demanded by social
justice and the

Common Good.

In this

regard,

not only an

evaluation of the individual's total socio-economic contribution to
society (in contrast to purely economic imputations at the margin)
would have to be taken into consideration, but also, and most
importantlY, the minimal requirements for the development of his
human potential would have to be made available.

Secondly, if we

are guided by the preceding principles in the conduct of everyday
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affairs, it is a logical consequence that our actions, as measured
by the standards of individual and social needs and wants and their
satisfaction, must be effective and appropriate.

Up to a certain

point this is merely the statement of a triviality.

What is not,

is that our actions will in that case be also just.

An

action is

just if it complies with the Natural Law, either as a set of rules
directly imposed by nature upon us, or as norms that conform with
objective social necessity at a given time, as seen under the
guidance of ratio recta.

What is necessary is rational (according

to nature's order) and normal.
necessity is just.

What effectively satisfies this

Then a just norm or disposition is that one

which is adjusted to the social necessity from a utilitarian Common
Good approach as viewed in the light of reason, ratio recta, under
the dictates of the Natural Law.
Thus, we conclude that the Common Good is not only, nor even
frequently, the resultant of the maximum 'satisfaction of many or
the greatest number in society; nor society's or the state's good
as separate and different from the individuals' good,

but the

maximum possible satisfaction for all, given the rights of each
person and a minimum, imprescriptible level of satisfaction of the
human needs of every person.

In the attainment of the Common Good,

members' agreements and differences, aspirations and needs, duties
and rights, must, of course, be taken into consideration.
In helping us

to concertize the

Common Good,

economics

provides us with the knowledge of possible alternatives of conduct
in a given situation and with criteria of efficiency and adequacy
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as regards the logical and intelligent character of relations
Nonetheless, economics

between ways and ends, means and goals.

will not provide us with unambiguous principles and

so~ial

values,

pUblic goals and objectives, much less· with moral criteria for
jUdging the good and the bad.
optimal

rules

modelling

However, the Natural Law as a set of

the

ideal

configuration

institutions and inter-personal behavior,
bette~

of

social

meant by nature,

or

its Creator, to guide our lives not only in the physical,

but also in the moral and intellectual world, provides us with
those essential criteria for jUdgment and action.

It offers us the

only available avenue for true and integral consistency among the
multifaceted and intricate requirements, desires and constraints,
posed by human aspirations interacting in an enormously complex
social world and
habitat.

in a

relatively small and

The natural order of things

~ust

limited physical

be necessarily followed

in order for society to function and evolve normally.

That is why

economics and the economic order must be organized along "normal,"
"natural," "just," "convenient," and "reasonable," lines.

All of

these conditions ideally converge and are subsumed in the concept
of the Good Society.

Now, the Christian society ordered according

to Natural Law, would constitute the embodiment of the Good Society
we wish to bring about.
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VII. COMPETITION AND COOPERATION AS ORGANIZING AGENTS
OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC LIFE
I doubt that the simple inter-relationship of the market with
other non-economic institutions will be sufficient to make a good
society, as K. Boulding seems to maintain in his works.

The very

difficult question consists in the fact that we want to preserve
the working of the market because of the nature of the functions it
performs (efficiency in resource allocation, free exchanges, etc.),
and at the same time we want a set of motivations of a non-economic
character on the part of the people who make it work.

Now, how can

we introduce these motivations without altering the beneficial
results

of

markets

and

also

create

responsibility we deem desirable?
follows:

How

far

do

an

attitude

of

social

The query could be also posed as

strictly

economic

motivations

determining the economic results of competitive markets?

go

in

Most of

us would probably agree that they determine them to a large degree.
On

the

other

responsibility

hand,

if

we

and mutual

saw

non-economic motivations,

concern,

as

a

e.g.

check on undesirable

outcomes brought about by the unrestricted and unalloyed operation
of economic forces (similar, perhaps, to those results that derive
from non-competitive markets), then it could be claimed that the
object

of

exercising

a

dose

of

social

responsibility

is

the

attainment of goals of a competitive-like character in the market.
It would seem that, in practical terms, the only way to avoid the
paralysis in action that would result from trying to simUltaneously
follow the conflicting motivations informing the market place on
the

one

hand,

and

those

which
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at

least

in

the

past

were

traditionally inculcated by church, school, and home, on the other,
at the same time that we seek to preserve the desirable results
flowing from the kind of behavior informing competition, is for
these two sets of motivations to intertwine or interlace in a
vertical rather than in a horizontal fashion.

That is, for them to

operate at different levels of social organization and action.
Although superficially this could be open to the charge long ago
made by F. Briefs concerning the application of dual ethics at
business and at home, such a criticism would essentially miss the
point.

The reason for this resides in the fact that in the model

of economic liberalism the two ethics apply in two unrelated social
realms: namely, the economic system and family organizations.

In

our case, both the motivation for self-advancement (gain, profit,
benefit) leading to competition, and the sense of responsibility
and communality that actuates the desire for social cooperation,
would be vitaily present in the sphere of public social life
through their embodiment in various socio-economic organizational
forms.

For example, the producing units (firms) and sellers of the

services of productive factors would behave competitively , and
thus,

be guided by the appropriate motivations; so also would

behave, as natural extensions of the latter, the trade unions and
trade or employers associations, which are group-individualistic
structures.
voluntary

On the other hand,
associations

would

vocational groups
be

animated,

and other

primarily,

by

considerations related to the good of their particular profession,
kind of activity, industry, or sector (their prosperity, stability,
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opportunities for human growth, modernization, and productivity),
and by the requirements of the Common Good in the relationships of
an activity, profession, industry, or sector with others and with
the socio-economic system in its totality.

Although competition

need not be based on egoistic motivations, much less constitute an
anti-social and self-centered act, it certainly is a necessary
social function for the maintenance of productivity and efficiency
and for a non-exploitative sharing of the product in a market
economy.

The competitive tension and exertion in production is

necessary to ensure lowest prices, highest quality and the adoption
of technical progress.

This, clearly, refers to a realistic type

of Marshallian competition, not to the textbook model of a static
and disembodied purely competitive system.

In distribution it is

necessary to actualize, even if as a first approximation to social
reality, a-pattern in conformity with the relative productivity of
the factors as flowing from their contribution to production as
this is evaluated by society, and not as it would result from a
monopolistic and monopsonistic appropriation of the product by a
central planning body or other non-market devices.
It should also be noticed, in relation to the fundamental
problem

of

the

differences

inherent

in

reconciling

the

two

antagonistic sets of motivations represented by competition and
cooperation, that such an antagonism could be mitigated although
not made to disappear altogether.

The amelioration could be

carried out by making the individual conscious in his education and
social formation that his competitive behavior is, to the extent
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that

it

is

carried out

in a

reasonably

"perfect"

market

and

sUbjected to the regulations and limitations that the Common Good
imposes on it, which is decidedly socially beneficial.

After all,

one should keep in mind that practically all of the criticisms and
invectives

against

the

market

are

really

directed

at

its

imperfections and not at the workings of the ideal pure model,
which is theoretically accepted even in the academic blueprints of
rationally planned socialist societies.

(The so-called model of

market socialism). In reality, the universal harmony notion of A.
Smith, gyg economist, his harmonia preestabilita, was only naive
and pedestrian to the extent that he, and others along the same
lines,

thought

that

self-interest,

no

matter

how

refined

or

enlightened, would be a sufficient condition for social harmony and
order to obtain.

Self-interest by itself cannot produce the best

of worlds, neither will results and effects flowing from actions
inspired' by

self-interest

be,

or

were

ever

likely

to

be,

voluntarily sanctioned and accepted by all.
The Common Good may require sacrifices from individuals and
groups that would not be elicited from them unless there were to be
a loyalty to trans-individual values.

No matter the degree of his

egotistic enlightenment, an individual which is guided exclusively
by such motivations will not yield to the Common Good

(unless

coerced) if he does not distinguish an immediate or future benefit
that

will

fUlly

acceptable to him.

compensate

for

his

sacrifices

in

a

manner

Interestingly, an egoist would have to possess

a vastly subtle and understanding mind to sacrifice as much as a
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simpler mind guided by values transcending his narrow personal
interests.

In any case, the bulk of the population would never

sacrifice out of subtle considerations.
The

sacrifices

required

by

the

Common

Good

may

become

increasingly difficult as they touch upon diverse socio-economic
issues.

starting by what may be particular restrictions on wages,

prices,

and profits

in a

certain industry,

to regulations of

investment policies and also of domestic output and imports with a
view to attain wider and more important national goals; to the
acceptance of the fact that under dynamic and unstable conditions
the market distribution may not comply with the Common Good and
distributive justice; to cooperation with structural reforms that
will perfect the market, making it more competitive through powerequalization

and

more

cohesive

through

better

implementation of the Common Good requires

knowledge,

the

the good will and

"disinterested cooperation of all:
with

the

limitations

already

expressed

it

remains

true,

nevertheless, that self-interest, especially when seen in the light
of its expression and realization in the traditional scholastic
context

of

society's

service,

remains

a

powerful

force

betterment and for the attainment of socio-economic harmony.

for
Once

self-interest is seen and interpreted in an appropriate social
framework, it will not be that difficult to adopt the cooperative
attitudes and the Common Good-oriented viewpoint that would be
required of those whose functions are to constitute vocational and
other voluntary groups.

That is, the transition from one set of
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motivations to the other would not be marked by the necessity for
radical reversions of attitudes, or for the need to bridge wide
chasms in orientation, thus making it almost impossible for the
same men to rationally and honestly perform both sets of functions
and share both kinds of attitudes.

A concluding word should be

devoted to the problem of natural harmony in the light of the
previous comments.

It should be obvious at this point that harmony

is neither objectively and necessarily present in the economic or
social order by the pre-determined or pre-established play of
natural and unswerving forces; neither does it derive exclusively
from man's intellectual resolution and determined will to see
harmony

and

order

prevail.

To

the

extent

that

the

latter

crystallizes it is due to the convergence of both objective and
sUbjective rationalism, to use Schumpeter's terminology.
In

the

economic

field

maximization

of

production

and

consumption values are logically established by the organizational
and behavioral conditions of the pure competition theorem, which is
logically correct and enormously useful as a referential schema for
society.

Undoubtedly, it has proven its worth in helping us to

organize our institutions and pattern our behavior along acceptably
approximate lines conducive to satisfying the universally expressed
goals of maximum satisfaction of needs in a limited and scarce
environment.

In the social field the attainment of harmony and

order is a more difficult endeavor.

In the first place, the

physically tangible restrictions are not as obvious as in the
economic field.

In the second place, and related to the first
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point, we have to deal with very complex and multifaceted realities
which

are

not

reducible

to

logical

models

or

connected by means of a few, clear-cut alternative
and institutional forms.
preceding,

are

primarily

organizational

Thirdly, as a logical deduction from the

it follows that the more encompassing the fields of

relations under consideration, and the more knowledge which is thus
required of entities like man and society, the more necessary it
becomes to weave and connect optimal forms of agglomeration and
conduct at several different qualitative levels of life.

We might

say then, by way of conclusion, that the more we travel away from
the immediate relations posed by a scanty nature and ambitious man,
the more necessary it becomes to appeal to SUbjective rationalism,
to deposit faith in the power of reason to discern and apprehend
the ultimate realities of man and his world.
Under contemporary conditions man must assume much larger
responsibility than in the past for the organization of his social
environment.

He must also grow more aware of the necessity to

foster the right kind of competitive-cooperative mix in order to
build a world both efficient and equitable,
harmonious.

It

would

seem,

as

stated

in

abundant and also
the

Summary

and

Conclusions to this work, that the hope for creating such a kind of
society must

be

based

on

fostering

a

truly

prismatic market

situation characterized by a wide variety of organizational and
structural forms.

In turn, this morphological pluralism must be

combined with the appropriate and varying blends of competitivecooperative motivations, attitudes and behavior, which are to be
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applied at different levelS of the socio-economic structure.

The

overall principle being, of course, that the cooperative component
must increase in importance as we pass from the individual to the
collective or from the particular to the general.

That is, as we

come to deal with those issues which constitute the prerequisites
for the actualization of the Common Good itself.

If these two

conditions were to appear to be too stringent for mankind to adopt,
let us pause and reflect on the fact that they constitute a minimum
minimorum in terms of required personal SYmpathy and good will on
the part of the social agents.

If these modest requirements cannot

be met, there is no hope of more complex and demanding schemes and
wide-ranging social reforms being adopted by society.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Ultimately, our definition of social economy must stem from a
view of essential human nature.

The harmonious and reciprocally

beneficial relationship between the basic traits constituting human
nature and the institutional and functional patterns of society
lies

at

the

Naturally,

foundation

consistency

of

any

among

conception

these

of

social

elements,

economy.

although

a

most

important necessary condition of social economy, does not by itself
ensure an efficient solution.

Cultural congruity and flexibility

to accommodate dissent are also significant factors in the search
for optimality.
Natural Law thinking by the scholastics adumbrated from the
Thirteenth

Century

onwards

organized along the

the

concept

of

a

market

lines of competitive pricing.

economy

Influences

hailing from the enlightenment in the continent and philosophical
empiricism
alternative
society.

and

utilitarianism

collectivist
In the former,

in

notions

England,
appropriate

helped
to

to

a

shape

socialist

the Common Good concept succeeds

in

establishing the desired correspondence between individual rights
and social obligations, but only at the cost of assuming extremely
stringent and clearly unreal conditions of market perfection and,
in

all probability also, at least mildly cooperative motivations

and sUbstantive compliance on the part of social agents.
In the absence of these, it would be hardly possible to solve
difficulties like those posed by the determination of the scope of

state

activities

and

the

concomitant
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questions

raised

by

distributive and contributive justice.

In the latter, the concept

of the commonweal overwhelms the individuality of the human person.
The group has precedence over the individual in a large number of
The subordination of personal ends to

activities and areas.
collective

objectives

unacceptable extent.

reduces

the

sphere

of

freedom

to

an

The antipodal laissez-faire social model

creates a mirror situation in which the Common Good cannot be
actualized.

The ensuing social ambience would negate the very

validity of the concept.
The foregoing observations could lead one to think that some
of the many variants of contemporary liberalism would represent an
ideal

compromise.

This' would

be totally unjustified.

The

mechanical juxtaposition of the market and the public sector is not
really a satisfactory solution to the problems of modern society.
The tensions generated by the opposite principles governing these
realms are opening a growing chasm which will be increasingly
difficult to negotiate by syncretic ideologies.

A new approach

which would integrate them would constitute the true hallmark of a
modern system of social economy.
However, no organic sYmbiosis is possible.
being curiously enough,

The primary reason

of a mechanical or processual nature.

There is an inherent contradiction between the methods used for the
expression of personal preferences

and their objective value

determination in society and those which must be applied in order
to externalize collective preferences and their objectified social
value.

No general theory of economic value which would reconcile
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these antipodal principles

involved

in the private-public or

individual-collective dichotomy is logically possible.
This leaves but one avenue only to an institutional attempt at
reform.

It would consist in the creation of a pluralistic market

of socio-structural and behavioral options.

The provision of

alternative modes of association in accordance with the demand
schedules resulting from the frequency distribution of voluntary
choices in a given population has a number of decided advantages.
Not only would it lead, ceteris paribus, to a maximum of aggregate
satisfaction, but it would also preserve the much valued efficiency
traits of a market system, while it would simultaneously allow for
a considerable degree of privatization of the multitude of variable
factors contained in the concept of the Common Good.

By the same

token, market responsive plural options would minimize the need for
agreement among the members of the body politic.

The social

contract or the volonte generale would be SUbjected to a minimum of
inner conflicting centrifugal forces.

Some general consensus would

still be necessary as to the more abstract and long term contents
of the Common Good in several areas of social life, but many other
thorny

issues

would

also

disappear

at

one

fell

swoop.

Interestingly, the latter are oftentimes those in which mutual
consent is most difficult.

The proximity of instrumental values

and social means magnify our readiness to clash over them, while
the

remoteness

and unspecificness

decrease our contentiousness.

of

higher values,

tend to

Lastly, a socially sponsored system

of market oriented organizational options can be affixed a price
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tag and the formula can be implemented on a piecemeal basis in
tandem with degree of social willingness and resource availability.
Only so can the Gordian knot be cut.
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